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and Peer Group Formation
7.1 Summary and overview
This chapter analyzes the eﬀects of the presence of social groups on the price-
setting behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist that produces a good with
a positive (local) consumption externality. The partition of society into groups
does not unambigiously give the monopolist the opportunity to raise its price
and increase its proﬁt. The eﬀects depend on a non-trivial interplay between
the strength of the consumption externality and on the speciﬁc composition of
the social groups.
7.2 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the eﬀects of the presence of diﬀerent social groups in
society on price-setting behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolistic ﬁrm. I
use social (sub)group as the encompassing term for both social classes and
social clusters. Social classes (or subcultures) are groups of individuals who
are close according to some measure of social distance, like e.g. income, age or
educational level. Think for example of yuppies or the population of students.
Social clusters — which may alternatively be called cliques or peer groups —
This chapter is based on joint work with Bert Schoonbeek. The related working paper
is Soetevent and Schoonbeek (2003).
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are groups of individuals with a high degree of personal interrelatonships, like
for example children in the same class.1
Authors like Akerlof have stressed the importance of social groups in in-
dividual decision making, calling “the potential existence of ( . . . ) subgroups
in the population with their own norms and values ( . . . ) one of the most
important consequences of social interaction theory.” (Akerlof, 1997, p. 1010.)
Within a group, there may be strong incentives to mimic the consumption
behavior of the other members. This may be caused by social reasons (con-
formity), technological reasons (network eﬀects), or by reasons of information
dissemination. To give an example, consider a teenager thinking about buy-
ing a cell phone. The utility he derives from owning a cell phone is likely
to increase with the relative number of members in his social subgroup that
own a cell phone, for mere reasons of communication or because his peers will
possibly ostracize him if he refuses to buy a cell phone.2 I refer to these posi-
tive consumption externalities that are contingent on an individual’s subgroup
as local externalities. They have to be contrasted with the externalities that
are commonly studied in the network literature. These are of a global nature
in the sense that they work through the number of individuals in society as
a whole that owns the good. The observed correspondence between network
models and social interaction models3 holds as long as society is considered as
one large social group, but changes character when society is partitioned into
diﬀerent groups.
Since local externalities are dependent on the social groups within society,
changes in the composition of these groups can lead to changes in equilibrium
pricing decisions. In this chapter, a simple, two-stage model with a proﬁt-
maximizing monopolistic ﬁrm is developed4 to analyze a market with local
consumption externalities. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm sets a (uniform) price for
its good and in the second stage, consumers decide whether or not they buy this
good. Due to the consumption externality, the purchase decision of a consumer
is postively dependent on the fraction of consumers in his or her group who buy
the good. I analyze the consequences of the presence of diﬀerent social groups
by comparing a benchmark case without diﬀerent subgroups with the situation
in which society is partitioned into two non-overlapping social groups. The
price set by the monopolist and its proﬁt are dependent on the strength of the
1In the literature on networks, the clustering coeﬃcient measures how closely knit a circle
of friends is (Baraba´si, 2002).
2Ormerod (1998, p. 23) describes how the dissemination of information aﬀects consump-
tion decisions within social groups: “If a friend or neighbour buys a VHS machine and is
satisﬁed, you are more likely to do the same.”
3For example, Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) note with respect to the externality caused
by network goods: “Though the reasons for this externality are technological rather than
social, the corresponding models lead to reduced forms that can be used to study the market
impact of the social phenomena described above.”
4For simplicity, I focus on the monopolistic case, but the main message — proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms should react to the presence of diﬀerent social groups in society — is
equally valid in other market environments.
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consumption externality and on the speciﬁc groups that are formed. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, the presence of diﬀerent groups does not automatically
increase the proﬁt of the monopolist. For some conﬁgurations, it lowers the
price and the monopolist incurs a loss as compared to the benchmark case.
In practice, changes to social groups can occur exogenously, as a result of
societal or policy changes.5 For example, the tendency to decrease class size
can be viewed as a development toward smaller social groups, at least when
one takes the position that a pupil’s class is a good proxy for his social group.6
In this chapter, the focus is on these exogenous changes in social groups.
Clearly, the monopolist may (besides changing its price) also react to the
presence of diﬀerent groups by means of advertising campaigns that are aimed
at inﬂuencing an individual’s perception of the fraction of members in his or
her group that buy the product. A real-life example is the Vodafone ‘How are
you?’-campaign. To teenagers, Vodafone tries to point out that a large fraction
of other teenagers in their subgroup own a cell phone by depicting young people
having fun at a pop concert. In the same commercial, the company conveys a
similar message to business men, by showing people gathered in an oﬃce for
an important meeting. However, the monopolist’s advertisement decisions are
not explicitly modeled in the current model.
In studies on network eﬀects, the existence of a positive consumption ex-
ternality gives rise to the analysis of compatibility decisions — should ﬁrms
opt for manufacturing compatible or incompatible products (Farrell and Sa-
loner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985 ; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000); should
they choose whether or not to oﬀer an adapter to make their products com-
patible (Baake and Boom, 2001) — and to the issue whether producers should
engage in introductory pricing to attract a critical mass of consumers (Cabral,
Salant and Woroch, 1999). I want to stress that one cannot simply interpret
the partition of society into smaller social groups as some kind of ‘reversed
compatibility’. When compatibility is made undone, the absolute number of
people in an individual’s network unambiguously decreases. However, in the
model of this chapter, the key determinant is the fraction of individuals within
an individual’s group that owns and uses the good. This fraction may as well
go up as down due to the partition. Furthermore, in the current model the
separation between groups is not determined by product heterogeneity but by
exogenous individual characteristics.
5Deliberate changes in social groups by self-selection of individuals, an issue that plagues
empirical studies on social interactions, is modeled in another branch of literature (see e.g.
Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992) and is not addressed in this chapter.
6The reason for this decrease is the impression that pupils in small classes have an advan-
tage over pupils in larger classes in reading and math, and is as such exogenous in the current
analysis. The ﬁnding is e.g. stated by Jeremy Finn and C.M. Achilles in the American Edu-
cational Research Journal (Fall 1990) when they refer to the Student/Teacher Achievement
Ratio (STAR) project: “This research leaves no doubt that small classes have an advantage
over larger classes in reading and math in early primary grades.” (see http://www.heros-
inc.org/star.htm)
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In the next section, the model is introduced. In section 7.4, equilibrium de-
mand, price and proﬁt are derived for a society without diﬀerent social groups,
and in section 7.5, the same is done for a society segmented into two non-
overlapping social groups. Section 7.6 investigates under which conditions the
presence of the two groups increases or decreases the monopolist’s equilibrium
proﬁt. Section 7.7 concludes.
7.3 The model
Consider a market on which a monopolistic ﬁrm supplies one good to a con-
tinuum of consumers with mass equal to 1. This continuum is segmented into
J ≥ 1 social groups. The market is modelled as a two-stage game. In stage 1
the monopolist determines the price p of the good. Assume that the ﬁrm is not
able to charge diﬀerent prices to the diﬀerent groups. Given p, the consumers
determine their demand for the good in stage 2. I will derive the equilibrium
of this model using backward induction.
Every consumer buys either one unit of the good or none at all. Within a
subgroup, consumers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic utility for the product,
but homogeneous with respect to the consumption externality. The utility of
a consumer in group j, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}, is given by:
U(φ, λj , p) =
{
φ + γλj − p if the consumer buys the product;
0 otherwise. (7.1)
Here φ denotes the intrinsic utility of the consumer for the product, with φ
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, φˆ]. Without loss of generality take
φˆ = 1. Social groups are formed by partitioning the population according to
the intrinsic utility φ. λj is the fraction of consumers in social group j that
buys the product, with j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}. The parameter γ > 0 incorporates
the strength of the bandwagon eﬀect.7 I assume that the bandwagon eﬀect is
equally pervasive in all groups, that is, γ is the same for all groups.
It is important to note that λj represents the fraction of the agents in sub-
group j consuming the good, not the absolute size of the local social network:
other things equal, this means that the consumption externality is stronger if 2
out of 3 peers consume the good (λj ≈ 0.67), than if 4 out of 10 peers consume
the good (λj = 0.40), even though the absolute size of the local social network
is larger in the latter instance. For example, in the cell phone example it is
easy to imagine that a consumer has a larger propensity to buy a cell mobile
phone when he can use it to communicate with 2 out of his 3 peers than when
only 4 of his 10 peers can be reached by means of cell phone.
7The bandwagon eﬀect was deﬁned by Leibenstein (1950) as ‘the extent to which the
demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also consuming the
same commodity.’ Note that γ = 0 corresponds to the classical case where externalities are
absent.
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In stage 2, consumers maximize their utility, taking as given the decisions of
all other consumers. Assume that each consumer has perfect foresight regarding
the purchase decision of the other consumers. Further, the ﬁrm has perfect
foresight with respect to consumers’ demand. The price that the ﬁrm charges
in stage 1 is set so that proﬁts are maximized. To ease the exposition, the




π = D(p)p, (7.2)
where D(p) denotes the total (equilibrium) demand for the good in stage 2.
Before entering upon the consequences of the presence of diﬀerent sub-
groups, I will ﬁrst analyze the outcomes when society is not segmented, that
is J = 1. This analysis will serve as a benchmark for the results obtained in
subsequent sections.
7.4 The unsegmented society
Assume from now on that γ < 1; that is, for the consumer with the highest
valuation the eﬀect of the consumption externality is always smaller than his
intrinsic utility for the good. For larger values of γ, the bandwagon eﬀect
predominates, which results in rather trivial equilibria in which everyone buys
the good.
7.4.1 Consumer’s demand
In general, there are in stage 2 three possible (Nash) equilibria when the total
population is not split into subgroups: one where none of the consumers buys;
one where a fraction of consumers buys; and one where all consumers buy the
good. In equilibria where only a fraction of consumers buys, they must group
according to their type, since ∂U(·)/∂φ > 0. For this reason, deﬁne λ = (1−φ¯),
where φ¯ denotes the intrinsic utility of the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying or not buying (note that, for notational simplicity, I delete the
subindex of λ in this one-group case). Solving the indiﬀerence condition for
this marginal consumer, we obtain:






The consumers that buy the good are those with φ ∈ [φ¯, 1]. Assume that
the marginal consumer purchases the good as well. Equation (7.3) shows that
φ¯ ≤ 1⇔ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ φ¯ ⇔ p ≥ γ, and the following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 7.1 In stage 2 equilibrium demand D(p) is:
(i) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p) = 1;
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(iii) If p ≥ 1 ⇒ D(p) = 0.
Thus, demand is complete (the mass of consumers who buy the good is equal
to zero) if the price is relatively small, demand is zero if the price is relatively
large, and demand is incomplete (the mass of consumers who buy the good is
between zero and unity) if the size of the price is in between.
7.4.2 Firm’s pricing decision
Turning to stage 1, I derive the pricing behavior of the monopolist, given any
γ. First, assume that (equilibrium) demand is D(p) = (1− p)/(1− γ). It then
easily follows that proﬁt is maximized if the price equals p0 = 12 , giving a proﬁt
of π0 = π(p0) = 1/(4(1− γ)). Note that demand only takes on this form when
γ ≤ p ≤ 1. Verifying this condition when p0 = 12 leads to the restriction that
γ ≤ 12 . If γ ≥ 12 , all consumers want to buy the product as long as p ≤ γ,
leading to the optimal price p0 = γ with corresponding proﬁt π0 = π(p0) = γ.
The results are summarized below.
Proposition 7.2 The proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium price p0 and correspond-
ing proﬁt π0 = π(p0) are:
(i) If 0 < γ ≤ 12 ⇒ p0 = 12 ; π0 = 14(1−γ) ;
(ii) If 12 ≤ γ < 1 ⇒ p0 = γ; π0 = γ.
The result shows that when the conformity eﬀect is relatively weak (γ < 12 ), the
equilibrium price is unaﬀected by γ, but proﬁt increases in γ, due to the fact
that the demand increases if the bandwagon eﬀect becomes stronger. When the
propensity to conform is suﬃciently strong (γ ≥ 12 ), the monopolist will always
capture the entire market in equilibrium. In that case, proﬁt increases in γ,
since the optimal price increases if the bandwagon eﬀect becomes stronger.
7.5 A society with subgroups
In this section, the consequences of social groups on equilibrium demand, price
and proﬁt are analyzed. For simplicity, I focus on the case with two social
groups (J = 2). The segmentation is implemented by splitting the original
population into two groups according to the intrinsic utility of the consumers.
Consumers with the lower intrinsic utility φ ∈ [0, φs) are assigned to group 1
and consumers with the higher intrinsic utility φ ∈ [φs, 1] are assigned to group
2. I assume that φs is exogenously given, with 0 < φs < 1.
One can interpret the segmentation process literally as sorting individuals
according to their intrinsic utility. In diﬀerentiating between youth and busi-
ness men, Vodafone possibly indirectly distinguishes between two groups with
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diﬀerent intrinsic utilities for cell phones, as it might be that the intrinsic utility
that business men derive from a cell phone is higher or lower than the intrinsic
utility youth derives from the same product.
One can also interpret the segmentation based on φ as a segmentation on
basis of income. This can be seen as follows. Suppose, for the moment, that a
population of consumers have identical ordinal preferences, and diﬀer only in
their incomes. Consider the additive separable utility function
U = s + u(I − p), (7.4)
where I is the income of the consumer, s is the utility associated with the
good under consideration, and u(I − p) the utility associated with all other
goods. Assume that u(·) is strictly concave. If p is small relative to I, then the
ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion shows that
U = s− u′(I)p, (7.5)
which implies that the utility function is formally equivalent with
U = θs− p, (7.6)
with θ ≡ 1/u′(I). (See also Tirole, 1988, p. 97.) When income is high,
marginal utility of income is low and the value of θ is large. This corresponds
with a large value of φ in (7.1), when the externality eﬀect in this equation is
neglected. With reference to the examples, it is plausible that a segmentation
into youth and business men also entails a segmentation on basis of income.
With respect to schools, a segmentation of pupils, correlated with the funds
they can draw on, occurs when richer families have a tendency to send their
children to private instead of public schools.
Notwithstanding these interpretations, the treatment of the presence of dif-
ferent subgroups is, admittedly, somewhat stylized, but it allows me to derive
tractable analytical results below for values of φs over the whole range (0, 1).
7.5.1 Consumer’s demand
The utility of the consumers in group 1 and 2 is still described by (7.1), with
j = 1 and 2, respectively. The demand function for each of the groups is
derived in a similar fashion as the demand function for the total population in
the previous section. Again, in equilibria where only a fraction of the consumers
buys, they must group according to their type, such that λ1 = (φs − φ¯1)/φs
and λ2 = (1− φ¯2)/(1− φs), where φ¯1 and φ¯2 denote the intrinsic utility of the
marginal consumers in group 1 and 2, respectively, that are indiﬀerent between
buying and not buying. Solving the indiﬀerence conditions for these marginal











φs, for γ < φs, (7.7)
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− p = 0⇒ φ¯2 =
(
(1− φs)p− γ
1− φs − γ
)
, for γ < 1− φs.
(7.8)
Using the expressions for φ¯1 and φ¯2, we can easily derive total equilibrium
demand D(p) = D1(p) + D2(p), whenever γ < min(φs, 1− φs).
Whenever γ ≥ min(φs, 1 − φs), multiple demand equilibria may arise for
some price intervals in both group 1 and group 2. For example, take the
situation with φs = γ and focus on group 1. Three price intervals can now
be distinguished. First, suppose that p < γ. Then there is no equilibrium
in which a fraction of the consumers buys the good. However, if all other
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consumers of group 1 buy the good, then even the consumer in group 1 with
the lowest intrinsic utility (φ = 0) will buy the good (that is, 0+ γ · 1− p > 0).
Thus, there is an equilibrium in which all consumers of group 1 buy. Further,
there is no equilibrium in which no consumer of group 1 buys the good (since
φs + γ · 0 − p > 0). Combining results, if p < γ, then there is a unique
equilibrium given by D1(p) = φs. Second, suppose that p = γ. Using the same
kind of reasoning, it can be seen that now we have an equilibrium in which all
consumers buy the good as well as an equilibrium in which no consumer buys
the good. Even more, it can be veriﬁed that equilibrium demand in group 1 can
equal any number between 0 and φs. Thus, there is a continuum of equilibria
in this case. Third, suppose that p > γ. Then, we can show in a similar way
that the unique equilibrium is given by D1(p) = 0.
Considering the continuum of equilibria for the case where p = γ, note
that the equilibrium in which all consumers of group 1 buy the good Pareto
dominates all other ones. For this reason, I follow Shy (2001, p. 20) and say
that the latter equilibria are characterized by a coordination failure. From now
on, the following assumption is adopted:
Assumption 7.1 There is no coordination failure in equilibrium demand for
the good.
This assumption is commonly used to solve problems with multiple equilibria
(see e.g. Shy, 2001; Baake and Boom, 2001 ). On basis of this assumption,
the Pareto dominated equilibria are ruled out in favor of the equilibrium where
all consumers buy. Invoking the assumption in the example, we have that
D1(p) = φs if p = γ.
Proceeding, it is useful to introduce a partition of the (γ, φs)-space (with
0 < γ < 1 and 0 < φs < 1) into the following four domains:
domain A: γ < min(φs, 1− φs);
domain B: 1− φs ≤ γ < φs; φs > 12 ;
domain C: φs ≤ γ < 1− φs; φs < 12 ;
domain D: γ ≥ max(φs, 1− φs).
See also ﬁgure 7.1 (in which domain A is further divided into subdomains A1 to
A6, as discussed below). In domain A the conformity eﬀect is below average,
γ < 12 , while in domain D this eﬀect is above average. Products for which
a conformity eﬀect is especially important are situated in the latter domain.
In domain B the dividing line between groups is drawn for a value of the
intrinsic utility parameter that is above average, φs > 12 . This means that a
small group 2 with a higher than average intrinsic utility comes into existence.
For example, the shift of children from (very) wealthy families toward private
schools is modelled best with parameter values in this domain. In domain C on
the contrary, the split takes places in the lower part of the intrinsic utility range,
resulting in a small group 1. In this case, one can think of ﬁrms introducing a
product to the main category of quite interested potential buyers, while there
is a small fraction of the population that has scarcely interest in the good.
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The following proposition can be derived in a straightforward way:8
Proposition 7.3 Imposing Assumption 7.1, in stage 2 total equilibrium de-
mand D(p) is described by:
domain A. For γ < min(φs, 1− φs):
(iA) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p) = 1;






(iiiA) If φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p) = 1− φs;
(ivA) If φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1⇒ D(p) = (1−φs−p)+φsp1−φs−γ ;
(vA) If 1 ≤ p⇒ D(p) = 0.
domain B. For 1− φs ≤ γ < φs:
(iB) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p) = 1;






(iiiB) If φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p) = 1− φs;
(ivB) If φs + γ < p⇒ D(p) = 0.
domain C. For φs ≤ γ < 1− φs:
(iC) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p) = 1;
(iiC) If γ < p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p) = 1− φs;
(iiiC) If φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1⇒ D(p) = (1−φs−p)+φsp1−φs−γ ;
(ivC) If 1 < p⇒ D(p) = 0.
domain D. For γ ≥ max(φs, 1− φs):
(iD) If p ≤ γ ⇒ D(p) = 1;
(iiD) If γ < p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D(p) = 1− φs;
(iiiD) If φs + γ < p⇒ D(p) = 0.
Proposition 7.3 states equilibrium demand in stage 2 for all relevant price in-
tervals and all combinations of parameter values (γ, φs). Observe that only the
following ﬁve types of equilibrium demand may occur: (a) demand is complete
in both groups; (b) demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group
2; (c) demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2; (d) demand is zero
in group 1 and incomplete in group 2; (e) demand is zero in both groups. In
particular, it is not possible that equilibrium demand is incomplete in both
groups.
8The proof is given in the appendix.
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7.5.2 The monopolist’s pricing decision
Now, we want to derive the pricing decision for the monopolistic ﬁrm, given
any γ and φs. To this purpose, a separate analysis is performed for each of
the four domains A till D. For example for domain A, the optimal price is
calculated in the following way. First, we calculate for all price intervals (iA)
up to (vA) mentioned in Proposition 7.3 the optimal price, say p∗iA, . . . , p
∗
vA,
and corresponding proﬁts (π(p∗iA), . . . , π(p
∗
vA)) under the restriction that this
price indeed is in the given interval. Second, the expressions for the maximum
proﬁts in the diﬀerent price intervals are compared with each other. The price
that globally maximizes proﬁt in domain A is obtained as:
p∗ = argmax{π(p∗iA), . . . , π(p∗vA); γ, φs}, (7.9)
and the corresponding proﬁt is π∗ = π(p∗).
Deferring derivations to the Appendix, I present here the optimal price and
corresponding proﬁt for each of the domains. Doing so, I ﬁrst introduce two
threshold values for γ:
γ =
φs(1− 2φs)




Notice that γ < γ¯ since φs > 0. It turns out that domain A must be divided
into the following six subdomains for which the proﬁt comparison is executed
separately: A1 = {(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ ≥ γ¯ and γ > 12 − φs}, A2 = {(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ ≥
γ¯ and γ ≤ 12 − φs}, A3 = {(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ < γ < γ¯ and γ > 12 − φs}, A4 =
{(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ < γ < γ¯ and γ ≤ 12 − φs}, A5 = {(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ ≤ γ and γ >
1
2 − φs} and A6 = {(γ, φs) ∈ A| γ ≤ γ and γ ≤ 12 − φs}. The division of
domain A into the six subdomains is depicted in ﬁgure 7.1. Note that on the
curve d1 the equality γ = γ holds, on the curve d2 the equality γ = γ¯ holds,
on the straight line d3 we have γ = 12 −φs, and on the straight line d4 we have
γ = 1− φs. (The curve γ3 - γ4 in ﬁgure 7.1 is explained in section 7.6.)
It further turns out that, depending on the values of γ and φs, in equilibrium
there are four possible expressions for the optimal price and corresponding
proﬁt. I introduce the following notation for these four combinations:
pI = 12 ; π
I = (1−φs)4(1−φs−γ) ;
pII = φs + γ; πII = (1 − φs)(φ + γ);




pIV = γ; πIV = γ.
(7.11)
Now we are able to present the following proposition.
Proposition 7.4 Imposing Assumption 7.1, the proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium
price p∗ and corresponding proﬁt π∗ = π(p∗) are described by:
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(a) For (γ, φs) ∈ A2, A4, A6 ⇒ p∗ = pI ; π∗ = πI ;
(b) For (γ, φs) ∈ A1, A5 ⇒ p∗ = pII ; π∗ = πII ;
(c) For (γ, φs) ∈ A3 :
if φs ≤ 23 and γ ∈ [γ1, γ2]⇒ p∗ = pII ; π∗ = πII ;
if φs ≤ 23 and γ /∈ [γ1, γ2]⇒ p∗ = pIII ; π∗ = πIII ;
if φs > 23 ⇒ p∗ = pIII ; π∗ = πIII ;
(d) For (γ, φs) ∈ B:
if γ < γ¯ ⇒ p∗ = pIII ; π∗ = πIII ;
if γ ≥ γ¯ ⇒ p∗ = pIV ; π∗ = πIV ;
(e) For (γ, φs) ∈ C:
if γ ≤ 12 − φs ⇒ p∗ = pI ; π∗ = πI ;
if γ > 12 − φs ⇒ p∗ = pII ; π∗ = πII ;
(f) For (γ, φs) ∈ D ⇒ p∗ = pIV ; π∗ = πIV .









(1 − φs)(2− 3φs)
(1− φs)(1 + 3φs) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
In ﬁgure 7.2 the equilibrium fractions of buyers in both groups is depicted
for the four possible outcomes given in Proposition 7.4. In this ﬁgure λI1 and
λI2 denote the fractions of consumers that buy in equilibrium in, respectively,
group 1 and group 2, in the area where the optimal proﬁt is given by πI . In a
similar way, I deﬁne λII1 and λ
II
2 , etcetera.
Note that the area where πI is maximal is in the lower left corner of ﬁg-
ure 7.2, where both the bandwagon eﬀect γ is relatively small and the value
φs at which the original population is split is small. The latter implies that
group 1 is relatively small here, whereas group 2 is relatively large. Figure 7.2
shows that below the line d3, only a fraction of the consumers in group 2 (those
with the higher intrinsic utility) buys and nobody in group 1. Intuitively, a
higher γ helps the ﬁrm to win consumers for his product. Since in the lower
left corner, both the intrinsic utility of the consumers in group 1 (and, thus,
the size of this group) and the value of γ are low, it is not proﬁtable for the
ﬁrm to lower prices to induce individuals in group 1 to buy. Moreover, the low
value of γ also prohibits the ﬁrm from selling to all members of group 2. At
points at the line d3, all individuals in group 2 buy, even the person with the
lowest intrinsic utility φs. The message this line contains is that it is proﬁtable
for the ﬁrm to sell to the person with lowest intrinsic utility φs in group 2,
even as (starting from a point on d3) the value of φs decreases, as long as this
decrease is compensated by an accompanying increase in the bandwagon eﬀect
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γ. Notice that due to this increase in the bandwagon eﬀect, the ﬁrm does not
have to decrease prices to induce the marginal group 2 member to buy (on d3
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Figure 7.2: Equilibrium fractions of buyers for the diﬀerent areas in (γ, φs)-
space.
In the middle part of ﬁgure 7.2, πII is optimal. The ﬁgure shows that in this
case the equilibrium price is such that the monopolist captures all members of
group 2 as customers and none of group 1: the segmentation of the population
into buyers and non-buyers coincides with the segmentation into peer groups.
Again, the low intrinsic utility of the potential buyers in group 1 makes it
unattractive for the ﬁrm to sell to them. However, the value of γ is high
enough to win all members of group 2 for the product. In the next section, I
discuss that in this area, given φs, a stronger bandwagon eﬀect leads to strongly
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increased prices. However, once the border denoted by d4 is crossed, it pays to
decrease prices sharply in order to induce all individuals in group 1 to buy the
product too. On the line denoted by d4, πII = πIV .
In the upper left corner of ﬁgure 7.2, the value φs is relatively high, which
means that group 1 is relatively large and group 2 is relatively small. More-
over, the bandwagon eﬀect is modest. In this area πIII is optimal, and all
members of group 2 as well as some individuals of group 1 (those with the
higher intrinsic utility) buy. In the next section I argue that the ﬁrm makes
some price concessions to induce consumers in group 1 to buy the product. If
the curve denoted by γ1 and γ2 is crossed in upward direction, consumers in
group 1 with the highest values of the intrinsic utility parameter are starting to
buy the good. On curve d2 in ﬁgure 7.2 all members of group 1 buy, even the
person with intrinsic utility equal to zero. If, starting from a point on d2, the
size of φs increases, then the price will increase (see pIII). The individual of
group 1 with intrinsic utility equal to zero is just induced to buy if this increase
in price is compensated by an accompanying increase in the bandwagon eﬀect
γ.
Finally, in the (upper) right part of ﬁgure 7.2, πIV is optimal. In this area
all individuals will buy in equilibrium. The reason is that in this case, the size
of the bandwagon eﬀect prevails over the individual intrinsic utilities.
7.6 Eﬀects of social subgroups on prices and
proﬁts
Properties 7.2 and 7.4 provide the equilibrium price and proﬁt for the situation
with one or two social groups, respectively. We can now compare the equi-
librium prices and proﬁts that are obtained before and after the formation of
subgroups. Given the presence of a bandwagon eﬀect, it is natural to think that
splitting a population into smaller groups is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm, since smaller
groups increase the possibilities to use the bandwagon eﬀect to its advantage.
Proposition 7.5 shows that this is only partially true. The proposition gives
the exact combinations of γ and φs for which equilibrium proﬁt is increased
due to the presence of diﬀerent social groups.
Proposition 7.5 Imposing Assumption 7.1, let π0 be the equilibrium proﬁt
with one social group and π∗ be the equilibrium proﬁt with two social groups.
We then have:
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(a) For (γ, φs) ∈ A1, A2, A4, A5, A6 ⇒ π0 < π∗;
(b) For (γ, φs) ∈ A3:
if φs ≤ 12 ⇒ π0 < π∗;
if 12 < φs ≤ − 12 + 12
√
5 and γ ∈ (γ3, γ4) ⇒ π0 < π∗;
if 12 < φs ≤ − 12 + 12
√
5 and either γ = γ3 or γ = γ4 ⇒ π0 = π∗;
if 12 < φs ≤ − 12 + 12
√
5 and γ /∈ [γ3, γ4]⇒ π0 > π∗;
if φs > − 12 + 12
√
5 ⇒ π0 > π∗;
(c) For (γ, φs) ∈ B:
if γ < 12 ⇒ π0 > π∗;
if γ ≥ 12 ⇒ π0 = π∗;
(d) For (γ, φs) ∈ C ⇒ π0 < π∗;








φs(1− φ2s − φs)
1− φs .
Using Proposition 7.5, ﬁgure 7.3 shows the (γ, φs)-combinations for which in
equilibrium the proﬁt in the case with two groups is, respectively, larger than,
smaller than, or equal to the proﬁt in the case with one group. In the lower left
part of the ﬁgure proﬁt is highest with two groups, in the upper left part proﬁt
is highest with one group, and in the right part proﬁt is the same under one
and two groups. The latter parallels a result by Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001)
who ﬁnd in the context of a spatial duopoly model that a single ﬁrm is likely
to capture the whole market when conformity is strong enough.
I have calculated numerically for diﬀerent combinations of γ and φs the
percentage change in the equilibrium price, proﬁt and demand if one compares
the case with two groups versus the benchmark case with one group. I will not
report all the details of the calculations here, but only make the following three
observations. First, when group 2 with the consumers with a high intrinsic
utility is relatively large (that is, φs is suﬃciently small), the ﬁrm has the
possibility to increase its proﬁt by a maximum of about 18%, reached at point
(γ, φs)=(1/3, 1/3). However, if group 2 is relatively small, and the value of γ
is smaller than 1/2, the monopolist’s proﬁt decreases, with a maximal loss of
about 8%, approximately when (γ, φs)=(0.3, 0.66).
Second, I have examined whether the changes in equilibrium proﬁt are
primarily caused by changes in prices or by changes in demand. It turns out
that in the lower left part of ﬁgure 7.3 there is a strong increase in price.
Given a value of φs, prices increase sharply as the bandwagon eﬀect becomes
more pervasive, to a maximum increase of 100%. However, when the line d4 is
crossed, prices fall again to the same values as in the case without peer group
segmentation. The reason is that then it is more proﬁtable to capture the entire
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Figure 7.3: Proﬁt comparison in the equilibria with one and two groups.
market instead of only group 2. In order to attract the group 1 consumers, the
monopolist has to reduce prices.
Third, in the upper left corner of ﬁgure 7.3, the price set by the monopolist
is lower in the case with two groups than in the case with one group (the
maximal reduction here is 23%). The reason is, that for values of γ and φs
in this area, both group 2 is relatively small and consumers in group 1 with
the highest intrinsic utilities have relatively high values of φ. Thus, the ﬁrm is
eager to sell to at least some individuals in group 1. However, these individuals
are not motivated by the buyers with higher intrinsic utility who now belong
to group 2. A price reduction is needed to induce them to buy. The modest
increase in demand that results is not suﬃcient to prohibit the monopolist from
suﬀering a loss due to the presence of diﬀerent social groups.
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Finally, suppose for the moment that the monopolist has control over φs,
what would then be his best response BR(γ) to an exogenously given value of
γ? The answer is that BR(γ) = (1− γ)/2, a function that runs from point (0,
1/2) to (1, 0) in ﬁgure 7.3 (not shown). All combinations of (γ,BR(γ)) are in
the area with λII1 = 0 and λII2 = 1 (see ﬁgure 7.2). This means that, when
given the opportunity, the monopolist picks φs in such a way that a perfect
segmentation in buyers and non-buyers is obtained, irrespective of the value of
γ.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I explored the consequences of the presence of local consumption
externalities, due to social groups within society, for the price-setting behavior
of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. The partition of society into small social
groups does not inherently lead to increased market power of the monopolist.
The sign and size of the change in prices and proﬁts is dependent on both
the strength of the conformity eﬀect and on the speciﬁc social groups that are
formed.
The formation of social groups is done on basis of the intrinsic tastes for the
good. Though this implementation has an interpretation as a segmentation on
basis of income, it is somewhat stylized and for this reason should be seen as a
ﬁrst attempt to model the consequences of social groups on price setting. In this
study, I only consider the case with two groups. A natural future extension of
the model would be to consider the eﬀects of partitioning society into partially
overlapping groups. Another modiﬁcation would be to explicitly model the
advertising decisions of the monopolist. A third possible extension is to allow
for ‘multiplicative preferences’ under which the value that consumers attach to
the local consumption externality is correlated with their intrinsic utility for
the good (see Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) for an example of this).
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7.8 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 7.3
In the main text, in equilibria where a fraction of the consumers buys, expres-
sions for the marginal consumer φ¯j in group j, j ∈ {1, 2} were derived. These









1− φs − γ
)
. (A.1)
Let us now turn to the derivation of total demand D(p) = D1(p) + D2(p) in
each of the four domains, to begin with domain A. For this area we can use
the expressions for the marginal consumers given by (A.1) without restriction
since γ < min(φs, 1− φs) for this area.
Note that
φ¯1 ≤ φs ⇔ p− γ
φs − γ ≤ 1⇔ p ≤ φs, (A.2)
and
φ¯1 ≥ 0⇔ p− γ
φs − γ ≥ 0⇔ p ≥ γ. (A.3)
Using this, we obtain that, in case γ < φs, group 1’s equilibrium demand
equals:
• If p ≤ γ ⇒ D1(p) = φs;






• If 1 ≤ p ⇒ D1(p) = 0.
Noting that
φ¯2 ≤ 1⇔ p ≤ 1; φs ≤ φ¯2 ⇔ p ≥ φs + γ, (A.4)
a similar analysis shows that, in case γ < 1−φs, group 2’s equilibrium demand
is:
• If p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D2(p) = 1− φs;
• If φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 ⇒ D2(p) = 1− φ¯2 = (1−φs−p)+φsp1−φs−γ ;
• If 1 ≤ p ⇒ D2(p) = 0.
Combining, we directly obtain the statements for domain A as given in Propo-
sition 7.3.
Next, in order to derive the statements for domains B, C and D, invoke
Assumption 1 and observe that, in case γ ≥ φs, equilibrium demand of group
1 is given by:
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• If p ≤ γ ⇒ D1(p) = φs;
• If γ < p ⇒ D1(p) = 0,
whereas, in case γ ≥ 1− φs, equilibrium demand of group 2 is given by:
• If p ≤ φs + γ ⇒ D2(p) = 1− φs;
• If 1 + γ < p ⇒ D2(p) = 0.
Using these results, we can easily derive the statements for domains B, C and
D of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 7.4
Domain A
Recall that in domain A, it holds that γ < min(φs, 1 − φs). First, I consider
the pricing behavior for each of the price intervals (iA) to (vA) indicated in
Proposition 7.3.
(iA) p ≤ γ When the price is smaller than or equal to γ, demand is com-
plete in both groups and the optimal price the monopolist can choose without
leaving the price interval is choosing the price equal to the upper bound of this









(iiA) γ ≤ p ≤ φs With demand given in Proposition 7.3, the following












Solving for p leads to the following expression for the corresponding price:
piiA =
φs − γ(1− φs)
2φs
,
which is decreasing in γ since φs < 1. Checking whether this price obeys the
condition γ ≤ p ≤ φs results in:




Remark that γ < γ¯ as φs > 0. Hence, for this price interval, we have to
distinguish three cases with respect to the optimal price:
(iiAa) If γ ≥ γ¯, the optimal price is p∗iiAa = γ and π∗iiAa = π(p∗iiAa ) = γ;
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(iiAc) If γ ≤ γ, the optimal price is p∗iiAc = φs and π∗iiAc = π(p∗iiAc) = φs(1−φs).
Thus, when γ ≥ γ¯, demand is complete in both groups; when γ ≤ γ,
demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2, and when γ < γ < γ¯,
demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group 2.
(iiiA) φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ When price is within this interval, demand is zero
in group 1 and complete in group 2. As in (iA) the optimal decision for the
ﬁrm is to choose price equal to the upper bound of the price interval, which is





(ivA) φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 When price is within this interval, demand is zero
in group 1 and incomplete or complete in group 2. With demand given in
Proposition 7.3, solving the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization gives
pivA = 12 . This price satisﬁes the condition φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 if and only if
γ ≤ 12 − φs. For this reason, we have to distinguish two cases:
(ivAa) If γ ≤ 12 − φs, the optimal price is p∗ivAa = 12 and π∗ivAa = π(p∗ivAa) =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ) . In this case, if γ <
1
2 − φs, demand is positive in group 2.
(ivAb) If γ > 12 −φs, the optimal price is p∗ivAb = φs + γ and π∗ivAb = π(p∗ivAb ) =
(1 − φs)(φs + γ). In this case, demand is complete in group 2.
(vA) p ≥ 1 For prices larger than 1, demand is zero in both groups and
proﬁts are zero as well, π∗vA = π(p
∗
vA) = 0.
After this derivation of the optimal price and the corresponding proﬁt for
each of the ﬁve price intervals, the second step of the procedure is carried
out. In this step, the maximum proﬁts in the ﬁve price intervals are compared
given any combination of (γ, φs) within domain A. The price p∗ is chosen that
maximizes overall proﬁt π(p; γ, φs). Since for price interval (iiA) and (ivA)
there are three, respectively, two, subcases – dependent on whether γ exceeds
certain threshold values – domain A is divided into the six subdomains A1 to A6
introduced in section 7.5. For each of these subdomains maximum proﬁts over
the ﬁve diﬀerent price intervals are compared, given a particular combination
of (γ, φs). That price is deemed optimal that maximizes overall proﬁts.
The relevant expressions of proﬁt that have to be compared for the diﬀerent
subdomains are:
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Thus, the optimal price and proﬁt when (γ, φs) is in subdomain A1 are given
by p∗A1 = p
∗
ivAb = φs + γ and π
∗
A1
= π∗ivAb = (1− φs)(φs + γ).








such that only the expressions for π∗iiiA and π
∗
ivAa have to be compared. Note
that
π∗ivAa ≥ π∗iiiA ⇔ 1 ≥ 4(φs + γ)(1− φs − γ),
which is satisﬁed since φs + γ ≤ 12 in subdomain A2. Thus, p∗A2 = p∗ivAa = 12













What remains to be shown is for which (γ, φs)-combinations π∗ivAb maximizes
overall proﬁt and for which values (if any) π∗iiAb . To this purpose, solve the
equation π∗iiAb = π
∗




⇔ [φs − γ(1− φs)]2 = 4φs(φs − γ)(1− φs)(φs + γ)
⇔ φ2s − 2γφs(1− φs) + γ2(1− φs)2 = 4φs(1− φs)(φ2s − γ2)
⇔ γ2(1− φs)(1− φs + 4φs)− 2γφs(1− φs)− 4φ3s(1− φs) + φ2s = 0
⇔ γ2(1− φs)(1 + 3φs)− 2γφs(1− φs) + φ2s − 4φ3s(1− φs) = 0.








(1− φs)(2 − 3φs)
(1− φs)(1 + 3φs) . (A.5)
If φs ≤ 23 , then the square root in (A.5) is non-negative. If φs > 23 , then this
root is imaginary, and π∗iiAb ≥ π∗ivAb for all values of γ. Thus:
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• If φs > 23 ⇒ p∗A3 = p∗iiAb = φs−γ(1−φs)2φs and π∗A3 = π∗iiAb =
(φs−γ(1−φs))2
4φs(φs−γ) ;
• If φs ≤ 23 and γ ∈ [γ1, γ2] ⇒ p∗A3 = p∗ivAb = φs + γ and π∗A3 =
π∗ivAb = (1− φs)(φs + γ);
• If φs ≤ 23 and γ /∈ [γ1, γ2] ⇒ p∗A3 = p∗iiAb and π∗A3 = π∗iiAb .
See ﬁgure 7.1, where the roots γ1 and γ2 of (A.5) are depicted. The ﬁgure
shows that γ1 and γ2 are indeed relevant since they overlap with subdomain
A3.
• ad A4 From the preceding, we know that
π∗ivAa ≥ π∗iiiA > π∗iA > π∗vA.











⇔ [φs − γ(1− φs)]2(1− φs − γ) = (1− φs)φs(φs − γ)
⇔ −γ3(1− φs)2 + γ2(1− φs)[2φs + (1− φs)2]
+γφs[(1− φs)− 2(1− φs)2 − φs] = 0.
Solving for γ, we obtain γ = 0 or
γ1′,2′ =
(1− φs)(1 + φ2s)±
√
Discr
2(1− φs)2 > 0, (A.6)
with Discr = (1 − φs)2[(1 + φ2s)2 − 4φs(1 − 2φs(1 − φs))]. Notice that in
subdomain A4, we have Discr < (1 − φs)2(1 + φ2s)2 since 1 − 2φs(1 − φs) >
1 − (1 − φs) > 0. The latter follows from the fact that φs < 12 in subdomain
A4.
However, one can show that for each value of φs, the smaller root γ1′ in
(A.6) is larger than the corresponding value of γ¯. In other words, both lines
γ = γ1′ and γ = γ2′ are located at the right of line d2 in (γ, φs)-space.
Since π∗iiAb < π
∗
ivAa when γ /∈ (γ1′ , γ2′), the result is that p∗A4 = p∗ivAa = 12

















we have that p∗A5 = p
∗
ivAb = φs + γ and π
∗
A5
= π∗ivAb = (1− φs)(φs + γ).
7.8 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 163







ivAa ≥ π∗iiiA and π∗iiiA > πiiAc ,
The fact that π∗ivAa ≥ π∗iiiA follows since φs + γ ≤ 12 in subdomain A6. It










Summarizing results, statements (a), (b) and (c) of Proposition 7.4 follow
directly by noting from (7.11) that pI = p∗ivAa , π
I = π∗ivAa , p
II = p∗ivAb ,
πII = π∗ivAb , p
III = p∗iiAb and π
III = π∗iiAb .
Domain B
In this domain we have 1−φs ≤ γ < φs and φs > 12 . I ﬁrst consider the pricing
behavior in the relevant price intervals.
(iB) p ≤ γ In this case demand is complete in both groups. The optimal price
is p∗iB = γ, with corresponding proﬁt π
∗ = γ.
(iiB) γ ≤ p ≤ φs This case is analogous to case (iiA) of domain A. Using the
same γ and γ¯ as deﬁned there, I distinguish three situations with respect to
the optimal price:
(iiBa) If γ ≥ γ¯, then the optimal price is p∗iiBa = γ, giving proﬁt π∗iiBa =
π(p∗iiBa ) = γ.









(iiBc) If γ ≤ γ, then the optimal price is p∗iiBc = φs, with corresponding proﬁt
π∗iiBc = π(p
∗
iiBc ) = φs(1− φs).
Remark that when γ ≥ γ¯, demand is complete in both groups; when γ ≤ γ,
demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2, and when γ < γ < γ¯,
demand is incomplete in group 1 and complete in group 2.
(iiiB) φs ≤ p ≤ φs + γ Here we have zero demand in group 1 and complete
demand in group 2. The optimal price is p∗iiiB = φs + γ, with corresponding
proﬁt π∗iiiB = π(p
∗
iiiB) = (φs + γ)(1 − φs).
(ivB) φs +γ < p Now demand is zero in both groups, and proﬁt is zero as well,
that is π∗ivB = 0.
We now have to derive the price that maximizes the overall proﬁt in domain
B. Note ﬁrst that π∗iiiB = (1 − φs)(φs + γ) > π∗iiBc = (1 − φs)φs > π∗ivB = 0.
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Further, π∗iB = π
∗
iiBa = γ. In domain B we have γ ≥ 1 − φs, which implies
that γ ≥ (1 − φs)(φs + γ), or π∗iB ≥ π∗iiiB . Finally, I compare π∗iB and π∗iiBb .





iiBb⇔ [φs − γ(1− φs)]2 = 4φs(φs − γ)γ
⇔ γ2(1 + φs)2 − 2φs(1 + φs)γ + φ2s = 0
Solving for γ, we obtain γ = φs/(1 + φs) = γ¯. Concluding, we have the fol-
lowing in domain B. If γ < γ¯, then the optimal price is p∗ = p∗iiBb , with
corresponding proﬁt π∗ = π∗iiBb . On the other hand, if γ ≥ γ¯, then the optimal
price is p∗ = p∗iB , with corresponding proﬁt π
∗ = π∗iB .
Domain C
In this domain we have φs ≤ γ < 1 − φs and φs < 12 . Again, I ﬁrst consider
the pricing behavior in the relevant price intervals.
(iC) p ≤ γ In this case demand is complete in both groups. The optimal price





(iiC) γ < p ≤ φs + γ Here demand is zero in group 1 and complete in group 2.





(φs + γ)(1− φs).
(iiiC) φs + γ ≤ p ≤ 1 This case is analogous to case (ivA) of domain A. We
have to distinguish two subcases:






(iiiCb) If γ > 12 − φs, then the optimal price is p∗iiiCb = φs + γ, and the proﬁt
is π∗iiiCb = π(p
∗
iiiCb ) = (1− φs)(φs + γ).
(ivC) 1 < p Now demand is zero in both groups, and proﬁt is zero as well, that
is π∗ivC = 0.
In order to derive the price that maximizes the overall proﬁts in domain C,
remark that in this domain we have γ < 1 − φs. As a result, we have γ <
(1 − φs)(φs + γ). Using this, we obtain the following for domain C. If γ ≤
1
2 − φs, then the overall optimal price is p∗ = p∗iiiCa = 12 , with corresponding
proﬁt π∗ = π∗iiiCa =
(1−φs)
4(1−φs−γ) . On the other hand, if γ >
1
2 − φs, then the
overall optimal price reads p∗ = p∗iiiCb = (φs + γ), with corresponding proﬁt
π∗ = π∗iiiCb = (1− φs)(φs + γ).
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Domain D
In this domain we have γ ≥ max(φs, 1−φs). Again, I ﬁrst consider the pricing
behavior in the relevant price intervals.
(iD) p ≤ γ In this case demand is complete in both groups. The optimal price





(iiD) γ < p ≤ φs + γ Now demand is zero in group 1 and complete in
group 2. The optimal price is p∗iiD = φs + γ and the resulting proﬁt is
π∗iiD = π(p
∗
iiD) = (1− φs)(φs + γ).
(iiiD) φs + γ ≤ p Here demand is zero in both groups, and proﬁt is zero as
well, π∗iiiD = 0.
In order to derive the price that maximizes the overall proﬁt in domain D,
notice that in this domain we have γ ≥ 1 − φs. As a result, we have γ ≥
(1 − φs)(φs + γ). From this it easily follows that the overall optimal price is
p∗ = γ, with corresponding proﬁt π∗ = γ.
Summarizing, and using the deﬁnitions of pI , πI , pII , πII , pIII , πIII , pIV and
πIV as given in (7.11) of the main text, we easily obtain statements (d), (e)
and (f) of Proposition 7.4.
Proof of Proposition 7.5
Proposition 7.2 shows that the equilibrium proﬁt for the situation with a single
group is given by π0 = 14(1−γ) if γ ≤ 12 , and π0 = γ if γ ≥ 12 . Proposition 7.4
shows that the equilibrium proﬁt π∗ in the situation with two peer groups is
given by either π∗ = πI = (1−φs)4(1−φs−γ) , π
∗ = πII = (1−φs)(φs +γ), π∗ = πIII =
[φs−γ(1−φs)]2
4φs(φs−γ) , or π
∗ = πIV = γ. To ascertain whether the equilibrium proﬁt is
larger before or after the formation of peer groups, π0 is compared with π∗ for
all six relevant combinations.
• First, take the case where π0 = 14(1−γ) and π∗ = πII . Observe that this
combination of values is relevant if 0 < γ < 12 , in particular in the subdomains
A1, A5, a part of A3, and a part of domain C (where 12 − φs < γ < 12 ). For
each of these areas, apply the following procedure. First, check whether π0 and
πII are not simply identical in the whole area under consideration. Second, if
that is not the case, infer for each possible value of φs in the relevant area, for
which values of γ (if any) we have that π0 = πII . Note that in solving this
equation, for the moment, we do not impose any condition on γ. Next, check
whether the combinations of φs and γ thus obtained are in the area under
consideration. If this is the case, the area is divided into a part where having
two peer groups leads to higher proﬁt, and another part where one group is
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best for the ﬁrm. Otherwise, for the whole area, either having one group or
having two peer groups leads to the highest equilibrium proﬁt. Carrying out







φs(1− φ2s − φs)
1− φs . (A.7)
In ﬁgure 7.3, the curve corresponding to the roots γ3 and γ4 is depicted. Notice





Further, observe that the second term on the right-hand side of (A.7) becomes
zero for φs = (− 12 ± 12
√
5). Thus, in the areas under consideration, when
φs > (− 12 + 12
√
5), then γ3,4 are imaginary and having two peer groups is
always less proﬁtable than having one peer group. On the other hand, when
1
2 < φs ≤ (− 12 + 12
√
5), having two peer groups is more proﬁtable if γ ∈ (γ3, γ4)
and less proﬁtable if either 0 < γ < γ3 or γ4 < γ < 12 .• Second, proceeding in a similar way, take the case where π0 = γ and
π∗ = πII . Notice that this combination of values is relevant in the part of
domain C where γ ≥ 12 . In this case, the equation π0 = πII is solved for
γ = 1 − φs. However, this coincides with the border of the domains C and D
(which itself is part of domain D). Combining this with the results above, we
see that having two peer groups is more proﬁtable than having one group for
all points in domain C where π∗ = πII .
• Third, examine the case where π0 = 14(1−γ) and π∗ = πIII . This combi-
nation of values is relevant if 0 < γ < 12 , in particular in the remaining part of
A3 and a part of domain B (where γ < γ¯). Solving for this case the equation





1− 2φs + 5φ2s
2(1− φs) .
I now ﬁrst show that the smaller value, that is γ5, is larger than or equal to
γ¯ = (φs)/(φs + 1) (which is represented by d2 in ﬁgure 7.1). In order to do so,
observe that
(1 + φs)2 − 2φs(1− φs)− (φs + 1)
√
1− 2φs + 5φ2s ≥ 0⇔
1 + 3φ2s − (φs + 1)
√
1− 2φs + 5φ2s ≥ 0⇔
√
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[1 + 2φs + φ2s][1− 2φs + 5φ2s]− 1− 6φ2s − 9φ4s ≤ 0⇔
1− 2φs + 5φ2s + 2φs[1− 2φs + 5φ2s] + φ2s[1− 2φs + 5φ2s]− 1− 6φ2s − 9φ4s ≤ 0⇔
−4φ2s − 4φ4s + 8φ3s ≤ 0⇔
−4φ2s(1 + φ2s − 2φs) ≤ 0⇔
−4φ2s(1− φs)2 ≤ 0.
The last equation is true for all values φs ∈ (0, 1), which shows that γ5 ≥ γ¯.
Next, I show that limφs↑1 γ5(φs) =
1



























Concluding, in the whole area under consideration, having two peer groups
always leads to a lower equilibrium proﬁt compared with the situation in which
there is one group.
• Fourth, compare π0 = 14(1−γ) with π∗ = πI . The area where these values
are relevant is where 0 < γ < 12 , and consists in particular of the subdomains
A2, A4 and A6, and a part of domain C (where 0 < γ ≤ 12 − φs). In this
case only γ = 0 solves the equation π0 = πI . It is easy to verify that in
the area under consideration having two peer groups always leads to a higher
equilibrium proﬁt than having one group.
• Fifth, compare π0 = 14(1−γ) with π∗ = πIV . The area where this combi-
nation of values is relevant is where 0 < γ < 12 , in particular a part of domain
B (where γ¯ ≤ γ < 12 ). The equation π0 = πIV has a double root at γ = 12 . For
all other values of γ, π0 is larger than πIV , thus having two peer groups is less
proﬁtable than having one group in that case.
• Sixth, compare π0 = γ with π∗ = πIV . The area where this combination
of values is relevant consists of domain D as well as the part of domain B where
γ ≥ 12 . In this case we always have π0 = πIV , thus having one or two peer
groups leads to the same equilibrium proﬁt.
Together, these six results imply Proposition 7.5.
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